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Abstract—Supervised machine learning was successfully used
in the past to handle the vast amount of uncertainty data
in dynamic security assessment (DSA). Classifiers are offline
trained on simulated operating conditions and then used in the
online operation to identify unreliable conditions in this data.
The concept is to shift time-consuming simulations from online
to an offline workflow. However, relying online solely on these
classifiers requires high accuracies that are not always given.
Instead of relying on classifiers this paper focuses on using them
to use traditional DSA methods more efficiently. A probabilistic
approach on the output of the classifier is explored in more detail
and used to navigate online DSA simulations across contingencies.
An ensemble classifier is learned and calibrated by using Platt’
scaling to provide accurate probability estimates. Subsequently,
asymmetric learning is used to adjust a decision threshold and
rank operating conditions across contingencies. Simulations are
then effectively used to reduce operational risks. At the same
time, our approach addresses the asymmetric nature of the
learning problem, such as a missed alarm is more critical than
a false alarm. Through a case study on a real dataset of the
French Transmission Grid, it is showcased how the proposed
approach quickly reduces inaccurate predictions and risks. We
further study the sensitivity of the approach against inaccurate
estimations, such as the probabilities of contingencies. Finally,
the scalability to several contingencies and operating conditions
is showcased. This is a fundamental step forward to support
the development of a full probabilistic DSA that scales to many
contingencies. I. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The increasing share of renewable energy and the number
of flexible devices in modern power grids lead to critical
challenges in the operation. These challenges result from
the dynamics and uncertainty surrounding the generation of
renewables and the interactions of these flexible devices.
Existing operating tools of grid operators lack in handling
appropriately the risks of these uncertainties and dynamics.
Historically, operators maintained the ’N-1 criterion’ to se-
curely operate the grid: each asset in the grid could potentially
fail and operation must be maintained. Currently, the only
way of ensuring secure operations with ’N-1’ under dynamics
are conservative operations that require large safety margins.
Operating securely with large safety margins means to under-
utilize assets. A smarter way of controlling the grid would
allow using assets at capacity and avoiding grid investments
in more assets. Hence, new operating tools are needed that
ensure security and can handle these dynamics [1].
A. Toward a Dynamic Security Assessment
The assessment on whether the operation can be maintained
post-contingency is done in two parts [2], Static and Dynamic:
(i) In the Static Security Assessment, the post-fault equilib-
rium is computed and the local stability is assessed. The state
is considered as steady-state stable if the equilibrium is locally
stable and all voltages and currents fulfil defined constraints.
(ii) Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) considers whether
the system reaches the post-fault equilibrium. This assessment
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requires simulations of the system responding to a fault and to
validate whether the operating limits are maintained in the time
domain. These time-domain simulations are computationally
intensive; hence dynamics (transients) can currently not being
considered in realtime operation as the N-1 criterion would
require a very large number of dynamical simulations [3].
The problem of security assessments is that the ’N-1 crite-
rion’ requires many assessments in large grids. One assessment
is required for each potential contingency and in large grids
the number of potential contingencies is large. In the literature,
two approaches were applied to reduce this large number: one
is deterministic and the other probabilistic. In deterministic
approaches, a static short-list of contingencies classified as im-
pactful is considered [4], [5]. However, this classification may
change over time as it depends for instance on the probabilities
of contingencies that can change frequently due to weather
changes. In response, these probabilities and the impact of
contingencies are considered in probabilistic approaches with
promising economic savings [4], [6]. This shift from operating
with the ’N-1 criterion’ over a deterministic approach toward
a probabilistic approach was well discussed in the past for
steady-state (Static) Security Assessment (e.g., [7], [8]) and
recently reviewed [9].
Considering dynamics in these probabilistic approaches
promises large economic savings [4], [6]. However, it is
a current lack in research to consider dynamics in these
approaches and it is key to address it as the future involves
more dynamics [1]. Currently, the only way to ensure dynamic
stability is to operate with very large safety margins and
under-utilize the assets. Not considering dynamics in future’
security assessments would further result in under-utilization
and missing economic savings being larger than in the past.
We propose an efficient framework supporting the devel-
opment of a full probabilistic security assessment toward
considering dynamics and many contingencies. Initial work
toward a probabilistic DSA has been carried out by applying
similar approaches from static assessments [10] where an
impact (severity) function for transient stability and probability
estimates of operating points based on historical failure rates
were considered. In [11], some stability indicators were used
for the impact and weather data for the probabilities were
forecasted in [12]. Recently, [3] and [13] proposed a risk
function to consider the impact of the contingency and the
probability that a machine-learning based DSA is inaccurate.
In [13] these functions were used to compute control actions.
Statistical machine learning methods when used in a Monte
Carlo framework are promising for new DSA tools, as, once
trained, they generalize to unforeseen, uncertain operations.
The key advantage to consider machine learning in DSA is
that computations are significantly fast. The classical machine-
learning based DSA workflow is presented as dashed lines in
Fig. 1. First, a statistical model is fitted to historical operation
data, then, a population of operation data likely to occur in
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Fig. 1: Machine-learning based DSA: Classic workflow (dashed lines) and
the proposed workflow (straight lines). The proposed workflow is presented
in Section II (offline part) and Section III (short-term operation part).
the next hours/days is sampled from this model. Next, a list
of critical contingencies is simulated for each operating point.
In these simulations the security of the dynamic response to
these contingencies are assessed. This procedure results in a
database that consists out of operation data and corresponding
(binary) values measuring the security (reliability) of these
operating points. Then, classifiers from machine learning are
fitted to this training database, where the features are the pre-
fault operation data and the post-fault response are the binary
classes (reliable class and unreliable class) [14], [15].
Conceptually, the workflow described above can be pro-
cessed periodically by a Transmission System Operator (TSO)
in an offline manner. Then, close to real-time operation, the
TSO can use these classifiers to instantly predict the output of a
DSA for a very large number of operation data that may occur
very soon. The key benefit is that this machine-learning based
DSA output is instantaneously available whereas actual DSA
would require significant computational budgets close to the
real-time operation to perform time-domain simulations; this
would be technically infeasible. Hence, the use of machine-
learning based DSA is conceptually promising for DSA,
however, several challenges still exist.
B. Challenges in Probabilistic & Machine-Learning DSA
The key downside of machine-learning based DSA is that
the output of the DSA may be incorrect, whereas actual DSA
is always correct as it simulates a model based on physical
laws. We discuss three specific challenges considering this key
downside and probabilistic DSA approaches.
A first challenge of machine-learning based DSA refers
to the fact that the training database of the classifier is
typically imbalanced in the shares of the two (binary) classes:
many more operating points correspond to the reliable class
(in particular the ones from historical records) than to the
unreliable class [16]. This imbalance may significantly impact
the balance of the predictive accuracy of the classifier. When
this imbalance is not addressed, then, typically the classifier
is more accurate on the major (here reliable class) than on the
minor class (unreliable class). This is an extremely important
challenge, as some inaccurate predictions may be hazardous.
A second challenge of machine-learning based DSA has to
do with different costs of inaccurate predictions. An inaccurate
prediction can be either a false alarm or a missed alarm. A
false alarm is when an operating point is predicted as unre-
liable, though, actually reliable, and a missed alarm is when
predicting as reliable, though actually unreliable. Whereas a
false alarm may lead to costs that correspond to unnecessarily
accounting for preventive and corrective control actions, a
missed alarm can be more hazardous. If an alarm is missed,
then, load disconnections may be the result (in the worst case
a total power blackout may occur) and the corresponding costs
may be very high [8].
A third challenge has to do with navigating the risk and
computational requirements of various DSA approaches. The
objective of the operator is to minimize the operational risks
with limited computational budget. Hence, operating points
that entail a particularly high risk should be assessed with ac-
tual DSA, rather than exclusively relying on machine-learning
based DSA [3]. The challenge is to select (filter) operating
points and contingencies that entail high risks.
C. Contributions
For the first time, the proposed approach combines machine
learning with traditional DSA methods (actual DSA) to in-
crease their efficiency to ultimately support the development
of a full probabilistic DSA scaling to multiple-asset failures.
In the machine-learning based DSA, we propose the follow-
ing offline workflow: We start by training an initial classifier;
we use an ensemble classifier [17] that combines multiple
Classification and Regression Tree (CART) [18] classifiers to
a single classification output. We select to train this ensemble
classifier by using adaptive boosting (AdaBoost) [19], [20].
Then, we calibrate this ensemble classifier by using Platt scal-
ing [21] in order to obtain accurate probability estimates for
the two classes (reliable and unreliable classes). Subsequently,
we propose to shift the classification’s decision threshold to
address the first two mentioned challenges, the class imbalance
and the cost-sensitivity of the two classes. These shifts are
used in asymmetric learning to minimize the expected cost of
inaccurate predictions. We select this cost-based approach as
it allows to adjust instantaneously the decision threshold as
it varies over time without re-training. The full workflow of
these approaches is presented as a combination of dashed and
straight lines in Fig. 1 (offline part). This machine-learning
workflow is simple, flexible and has the best performance
among a wide-range of boosting variants [22]. Note, apart
from the estimates of costs that an inaccurate prediction may
entail, which has a physical meaning, no other parameters must
be tuned or specified in this workflow. This is a significant
advantage over other machine-learning based approaches.
Our probabilistic perspective on DSA provides an operator,
for the first time, with guidance on how to combine machine-
learning based DSA and actual DSA. In our approach, an
operator first uses machine-learning based DSA to compute
the operational risks of contingencies and operating points,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. Subsequently, these contingencies and
points are ranked based on their risks. Simulations (actual
DSA) are performed in this order to assess high-risk contingen-
cies first. This approach allows efficiently using simulations
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Fig. 2: Probabilistic perspective on DSA to combine machine-learning DSA
and actual DSA. After computing the risks with machine-learning for all
operating points, time-domain simulations are used in the order of descending
risk (first high , then medium and finally low ).
and reduces significantly the amount of data to simulate.
This is a fundamental step toward the development of a full
probabilistic DSA scaling to multi-asset failures. A case study
on the IEEE 6-bus system is used to illustrate the challenges
and how our probabilistic perspective outperforms other ap-
proaches. Then, the French Transmission system is used to
showcase the scaling to multiple contingencies, computational
performance as well as the sensitivity of our approach on
parameter estimations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we present our proposed approaches from machine-learning.
Thereafter, we present our probabilistic perspective on DSA
in Section III that combines machine learning with actual
DSA. Subsequently, the case study is presented in Section IV.
Finally, Section V is the conclusion.
II. MACHINE-LEARNING BASED DSA
To use machine learning in DSA typically involves a binary
classification problem. An operating point i of the system can
either (a) fulfil some reliability criteria in the time domain
when contingency c occurs and is considered as reliable
yi,c = 1 or (b) the operating point does not fulfil the criteria
and is considered as unreliable yi,c = 0. Binary classification
is used to predict this binary label yi,c based on a feature vector
xi consisting out of steady-state real values that describe the
operating point, such as power injections, loads, phase angles
and voltages of the buses. To learn a classifier requires a
training database: a population of operating points ΩT , where
each operating point i ∈ ΩT corresponds to a feature vector
xi and a label yi,c. The population of unreliable operating
points at contingency c is ΩT,0c = {i ∈ ΩT |yi,c = 0} and
of reliable operating points ΩT,1c = {i ∈ ΩT |yi,c = 1}, thus
ΩT = ΩT,0c ∪ ΩT,1c .
A. Asymmetric Learning
The first challenge is the class imbalance. |ΩT,1c | > |ΩT,0c |
can be typically observed [16]. | · | denotes the cardinality of a
set. This class imbalance can be captured by the two different
class priors pi0c = |ΩT,0c |/|ΩT | and pi1c = |ΩT,1c |/|ΩT |.
The second challenge is that the cost of inaccurate predic-
tions differ. The costs of predicting an unreliable operating
point as reliable CF1c > 0 is typically greater than the
costs corresponding to predicting a reliable operating point
as unreliable CF0c > 0, thus C
F1
c  CF0c . These costs may
differ for each contingency c as well.
In fact, the two challenges of skewed classes (pi0c 6= pi1c ) and
skewed costs (CF0c 6= CF1c ), although typically discussed and
addressed in different contexts, can be addressed very similarly
[23], [24]. For example, assume CF1c = 3C
F0
c , then this is
equivalent to adjusting the class priors, which means, in this
example, to use each unreliable operating point i ∈ ΩT,0c three
times in the training set. In general, if we define the cost ratio
as Cc = C
F1
c
CF1c + C
F0
c
, (1)
then, the adjusted class distributions would be
pˆi0 =
C|ΩT,0|
C|ΩT,0|+ (1− C)|ΩT,1| (2a)
pˆi1 =
(1− C)|ΩT,1|
C|ΩT,0|+ (1− C)|ΩT,1| . (2b)
Note that we dropped the index for the contingency c for
simplicity reasons in Eq. (2). As just shown, there exist a
duality of the problems of skewed cost and skewed classes
[22], thus, the first two challenges can be similarly interpreted
and addressed in classification.
B. Classifier training
Here we discuss the training of an ensemble classifier that
consists out of many weak classifiers ΩE . Each of these weak
classifiers l ∈ ΩE corresponds to a hypothesis hl(xi) = {0, 1},
which predicts the binary label of operating point i based on
feature vector xi. Subsequently, these hypotheses are weighted
by wl and combined as a weighted majority vote to obtain the
binary label
HE(xi) =

0 if
∑
l∈ΩE
wlhl(xi) < 0.5
1 if
∑
l∈ΩE
wlhl(xi) ≥ 0.5.
(3)
To learn this ensemble classifier from a training population of
operating points ΩT we used Adaptive boosting (AdaBoost)
that is an iterative process [19], [22], which is here not further
discussed. However, the output of an ensemble classifier can
be either the predicted binary label HE(xi), as introduced in
Eq. (3), or a score such as
s1(xi) =
∑
j∈ΩE |hj(xi)=1
wj
/∑
j∈ΩE
wj . (4)
s1(xi) ∈ [0, 1] quantifies the weighted and normalized vote for
the reliable class 1 of the operating point i (thus, the 1 as a
superscript) by accounting for the votes of all weak classifiers
ΩE . The score vote of the unreliable class can be calculated
through s1(xi) + s0(xi) = 1. These scores can be used to
obtain accurate probability estimates after calibrating.
C. Calibration
Calibration is used to convert the score output of a classifier
into a probability estimate pˆ1(xi). Also here, the superscript
1 stands for the probability estimate of the reliable class
and accordingly the probability estimate for the unreliable
class can be calculated through pˆ1(xi) + pˆ0(xi) = 1. In this
calibration, Platt scaling [21] is used as it resulted in the best
probability estimates across several calibration methods for
boosting classifiers [25]. In Platt scaling, s1(xi) and pˆ1(xi)
are mapped by using the sigmoid function
pˆ1(xi) =
1
1 + eas1(xi)+b
, (5)
where parameters a and b are fitted by maximizing the
likelihood of a separate calibration dataset ΩK of operating
4points. The performance of this calibration can be quantified
by using the Brier score. First, the following sequence of
operating points in the calibration set ΩK is defined as k =
1, 2, . . . |ΩK |, where pˆ1(xk) ≤ pˆ1(xk+1). Then, this sequence
is split into |ΩT | subsets of operating points accordingly to
this sequence. Each subset is ΩTt for t = 1, 2, 3, ...|ΩT | and
has the same size |ΩTt |. As these subsets are split accordingly
to this sequence, the first subset is ΩT1 = 1, 2, 3, ...|ΩTt |, etc.
Subsequently, the average probability estimates p¯1t and the
fraction of reliable operating points pi1t are calculated for each
of these subsets t = 1, 2, 3, ...|ΩT |. Finally, the Brier score
is the squared sum of the differences between p¯1t and pi
1
t as
follows
B =
1
|ΩT |
∑
t∈ΩT
(p¯1t − pi1t )2. (6)
When the Brier score is computed for an uncalibrated classifier
the score s¯1 replaces p¯1.
D. Shifting the Decision Threshold
We propose to use a shifted decision threshold on the
probability estimates to minimize the risk of relying on
machine-learning based DSA when there is asymmetry. The
risk of predicting an operating point i can be described as a
disjunction Rc = R1c ∨R0c of the two risks
R1c(xi) = C
F1
c p
C
c (1− pˆ1(xi)) (7a)
R0c(xi) = C
F0
c (1− pCc ) pˆ1(xi), (7b)
where R1c(xi) and R
0
c(xi) are the risks of predicting operating
point i as reliable or unreliable. pˆ1(xi) is the probability
estimate obtained from the classifier learned for contingency c
and corresponds to Eq. (5). pCc is the probability estimate that
contingency c occurs. Note the similarity of using the prob-
ability estimate of the unreliable class pCc as a multiplication
with the costs in Eq. (7), and the equivalence of class and cost
skews as described in the beginning of Sec. II.
The operating point i should be predicted with lowest
residual risk: this means to predict as reliable iff the risk of
predicting as reliable R1c is lower than the risk of predicting
as unreliable R0c , thus iff R
1
c < R
0
c . Given this rationale and
Eq. (7), an operating point should be predicted as reliable iff
pˆ1(xi) >
CF1c p
C
c
CF1c p
C
c + C
F0
c (1− pCc )
:= z, (8)
where z is the shifted decision threshold, which is often also
called ’skew’ or ’probability cost function (pcf)’ [22], [26].
Note how z simplifies if there exist no cost skew CF0c = C
F1
c
or/and no class skew pCc = 0.5. Subsequently, the risk of a
prediction can be summarized:
Rc(xi) =
{
R1c(xi) if R
1
c(xi) < R
0
c(xi)
R0c(xi) if R
1
c(xi) ≥ R0c(xi)
(9)
III. PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON DSA
To ensure reliable power system operations requires the
operators to be aware of the future. Close to realtime oper-
ation, a set of potential future operating points ΩP may be
generated from some predictive model, where each operating
point i ∈ ΩP may occur close to real time operation (short-
term operation) with an estimated probability pIi . Then, in
DSA, this population of operating points is mapped to po-
tential contingencies ΩC resulting in many potential scenarios
ΩS = {(i, c)}| i ∈ ΩP , c ∈ ΩC}. Each contingency c ∈ ΩC
may occur with the probability estimate pCc . Typically, p
C
c is
obtained by historical failure rates or other informed methods
based on asset lifetime or weather data, as in [27]. These two
probability estimates pIi and p
C
c may change over time.
The operator’s key task in DSA is to identify the scenarios
resulting in unreliable operations. Ideally we would assess
each scenario s ∈ ΩS with actual DSAs. However, each actual
DSA requires a time-domain simulation that is computationally
expensive. This is the key challenge as the number of scenarios
is large and the computational budget is limited, hence it is
infeasible to assess all scenarios ΩS with simulations.
A. Combining machine-learning and simulations in online
We propose to use machine-learning-based DSA first for as-
sessing all scenarios ΩS as the computational time is negligible
and then, assessing a few scenarios with simulations (actual
DSA). Here, we consider a single contingency |ΩC | = 1
and assume that the computational budget allows running
S time-domain simulations, where typically S  |ΩS |. We
discuss three approaches to select the scenarios to perform
simulations on. The first approach is the standard approach
of operators and does not involve any machine learning, the
second does account for a standard classifier and the third is
our probabilistic perspective that uses advanced information
from a classifier.
1) No machine learning: This approach corresponds to
not considering machine learning in operations. The only
information available to decide without simulation on the
reliability of an operating point is the class distribution. Based
on this the operator can only randomly select a subset of S
operating points to assess with simulations to validate/falsify
the assumption on the reliability.
2) Standard classifier: The second approach corresponds
to using a standard classifier in machine-learning based DSA.
No decision threshold is applied and actual DSA is firstly
performed on operating points classified as reliable to reduce
missed alarms N1c as they typically entail higher costs than
false alarms CF1c  CF0c . Then, operating points classified as
unreliable are simulated to reduce N0c .
3) Probabilistic perspective: The third approach is our
proposed approach where we start by computing the risk of
relying solely on machine-learning based DSA
Rc,i = pIi Rc(xi), (10)
where Rc(xi) is the risk of inaccurately predicting operating
point i ∈ ΩP from Eq. (9). We have assumed that the
probability pIi is not correlated to p
C
c as p
C
c is part of Rc(xi).
Subsequently, we perform a simple sorting of the operating
points based on these risks R(j)c,i ∀i ∈ ΩP , where R(j)c,i is the
jth largest value. Then, we use simulations (actual DSA) on
the operating points in this order j = 1, 2, . . .min{|ΩP |, S}.
Consequently, the point with the highest risk R(1)c,i is assessed
with simulation first.
B. Considering many contingencies
The final objective is to efficiently use the computational
budget close to realtime when considering multiple contingen-
cies and operating points mapped as scenarios ΩS . As illus-
trated in Fig. 2, each contingency c ∈ ΩC requires to learn one
5classifier as the boundary of the reliable/unreliable operation
is different resulting in a different underlying classification
problem. After these classifiers are calibrated, the individual
risks of each scenario can be computed as Rs = Rc,i and, as
before, these risks are sorted R(j)s ∀s ∈ ΩS , however, here the
sorting is done across scenarios accounting for contingencies
and operating points. R(j)s is the jth largest value. Then,
we propose to simulate (actual DSA) these scenarios in the
order of descending risks j = 1, 2, . . .min{|ΩS |, S} until the
maximal computational budget of S simulations is used.
However, Rs is not the actual risk of relying on machine
learning; it is an estimate of the risk of a single operating
point being inaccurately predicted. To study the risk of relying
on machine learning requires the use of a testset ΩP . After
predicting the output for the testset using Eq. (8), the N1c
missed and false alarms N0c are calculated. Then for these
inaccurate predictions the overall risk is calculated as
Z∗c =
1
|ΩP |
(
N1c Cc pCc +N0c (1− Cc) (1− pCc )
)
, (11)
where equal probability of each operating point pIi =
1
|ΩP | ∀i ∈ ΩP is assumed to be equal across the testset that
is the case once a Monte Carlo method is used to perform
sampling. Note this risk calculation only considers the risk of
machine learning and not other risks such as considering a
limit number of operating points, modelling errors, simulation
inaccuracies, inaccurate estimations of input parameters, etc.
IV. CASE STUDY
Our approach is studied on the IEEE 6-bus system and on
the French Grid. We start with illustrating the challenges; then
how calibration supports obtaining accurate probabilities and
how to make cost-effective predictions. We compare our ap-
proach against a standard classifier and when not considering
machine learning. Our studies consider several contingencies
and the sensitivity of parameter estimations required as an
input of our approach. Finally, we provide insights into the
computational scalability and broadly discuss the approach.
A. Assumptions
1) Test systems: As a first test system the IEEE 6-bus sys-
tem was used from [28, p. 373-376] considering steady-state
stability and the DC-approximation. The pre-fault variables xi
of the operating point i were the three loads, the three gen-
erator power outputs, six phase angles and eleven line flows.
When computing the post-fault labels, corrective actions are
taken into account in the form of ±20 MW (re-)dispatches of
the generator powers. The loads are drawn from a multivariate
Gaussian distribution and a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of
0.75 is used between all three load pairs. Then, the loads are
converted to a Kumaraswamy(1.6,2.8) distribution by applying
the inverse transformation method. Subsequently, the loads are
scaled such that all loads were in the range of [50, 150] MW.
The generator powers are dispatched by a DC Optimal Power
Flow (DCOPF) with a linear cost function with coefficients
{12, 10, 8} for the three generators at buses {1, 2, 3}.
As a second test system, the French network was used
that had 1955 transmission lines, 798 transformers, 1886
buses, 411 generators and 127 shunt elements. The dataset
was also used in [16], had 16722 operating points, 35873
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Fig. 3: Probability estimation requires calibration: In (a) is the result of a
classifier using an uncalibrated score s¯1 ( ). In (b) is a Platt’ calibrated clas-
sifier resulting in acceptable probability estimates p¯1 ( ). Optimal probability
estimates would follow the diagonal ( ).
features and 1980 different contingencies were simulated;
9 different reliability metrics were computed. In our stud-
ies the metric for overloads, 5000 operating points (3500
training and 1500 testing) and |ΩC | = 11 contingen-
cies were randomly selected. The estimates for probabili-
ties pc and costs Cc of contingencies c ∈ ΩC were ran-
domly selected from {0.00001, 0.00005, 0.0001, 0.0005} and
{ 500501 , 10001001 , 50005001 , 1000010001}, respectively.
2) Machine Learning: The single DTs were learned via
CART [18] by using the package scikit-klearn 0.18.1 [29] in
Python 3.5.2. with default settings, such as minimizing gini
impurity; an exception was the restriction of DT depth at 3 to
avoid over-fitting. The AdaBoost ensembles were learned by
using the algorithm SAMME.R [20] with default parameters,
except the number of weak learners was increased to M =
100. The weak learners were DTs and prefitted with CART
with maximal depths of 1. A set of |ΩK | = 875 operating
points and 3-fold cross-validation was used to calibrate.
B. Challenges: class and cost imbalances
The impact of class imbalances was studied on the IEEE 6
bus system for a three-fault contingency on line 5 connecting
buses 2 and 4. The class imbalance is large at pi15 = 0.89 versus
pi05 = 0.11. A DT was trained on |ΩT | = 3500 operating
points, and the test error was computed using |ΩP | = 1500
tests; and repeated 10 times for different combinations. Overall
the test error was only 0.9 %, however, when disaggregating
test error into classes, 0.3 % were false alarms and 5.4 %
missed alarms. This imbalance showed that predictions were
more accurate on the majority than on the minority class.
The cost imbalance was studied on a fault on line 6 that
connected buses 2 and 5. Here, the classes were balanced
(pi16 = 0.52 and pi
0
6 = 0.48) and interference with the class-
imbalance challenge was avoided. The average test error of 10
DTs was on average 1.4 % and split into 1.4 % false alarms and
1.3 % missed alarms. Although this split of errors is balanced,
when assuming an imbalance in the costs of CF16  CF06 , then
the overall cost of inaccurate predictions was not minimized
as it would correspond to imbalances in the error.
C. Calibrating imbalances
We compared an uncalibrated and calibrated AdaBoost
classifier for contingency c = 6 to show how to address
imbalances. First, the uncalibrated scores s1(xi) were obtained
for the testing set i ∈ ΩP , then sorted and separated into
subsets as described in Section II-C. s¯1t was the average
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Fig. 5: Sole use of actual DSA on a subset of operating points. The classes
of the remaining points are assigned based on class distributions. (a) are the
inaccuratenly assigned classes and in (b) is the corresponding risk.
score in each subset t = 1, 2, 3, ...|ΩT |. Based on s¯1t and
the fraction of reliable operating points pi1t the reliability
diagram was plotted in Fig. 3a (we dropped the index t in the
figure). Then, calibration was performed using |ΩK | = 875
operating points and the average probability estimates p¯1t
were computed for each subset t. Accordingly, the reliability
diagram for the calibrated case was plotted in Fig. 3b. The
calibrated reliability diagram aligns significantly stronger with
the diagonal corresponding to the perfect probability estimates.
The Brier scores for the two cases were computed 10 times
using Eq. (6). The average Brier score of the uncalibrated
case was B¯ = 0.077 and of the calibrated case B¯ = 0.003.
This reduction in Brier score of 96 % showed that accurate
probability estimates require calibration.
D. Cost-effective predictions
In this study, the decision threshold z from Eq. (8) was
used to make cost-effective predictions accordingly to the
imbalances in costs and classes; different cost imbalances were
studied. The probabilities equalled across the operating points
and the probability of the contingency equalled the class prior.
The actual class labels were compared with the predictions
to compute missed N16 and false alarms N
0
6 . These were
then used to calculate for each cost imbalance the actual risk
Z∗6 according to Eq. (11). This procedure was repeated 10
times and the risk was averaged Z∗6 . The results in Fig. 4
showed that combining a decision threshold with a calibrated
classifier reduced risks; however, when using the threshold
on the distorted score s1 of an uncalibrated classifier the risk
is high particularly for high-cost ratios C. Hence, the larger
the imbalance the more important calibration and decision
thresholds become.
E. Machine Learning supported DSA
In this study, the operator had a limited computational
budget to analyse S scenarios with dynamic simulations
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Fig. 6: Balancing machine-learning DSA and actual DSA for a single contin-
gency. In (a) and (b), a standard classifier is used prioritizing to identify missed
alarms over false alarms, and (c) and (d) is our probabilistic perspective.
(actual DSAs) close to real-time operation. Contingency c = 3
(connecting buses 1 and 5) was studied from the IEEE 6-bus
system with cost of C3 = 1000010001 and probability pC3 = 0.0002.
The three approaches of Section III-A were studied as follows.
In the first approach, no machine learning was used; the
operator selects randomly S scenarios to simulate. By using a
testset of |ΩP | = 1500 the inaccurately assigned classes N13 +
N03 were computed for the scenarios that were not simulated.
Then, accordingly, the risk was calculated from Eq. (11). The
results in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b show the linear reduction in
inaccurately assigned labels and the risk. A traditional operator
following the N-1 criterion needs to simulate all points.
In the second approach, a standard classifier was used to
focus on missed alarms. The results for inaccurate predictions
and risks are shown in Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b, respectively. When
the computational budget allowed for more simulations S, first
N13 dropped to zero at 1205 simulations, then N
0
3 approached
zero at 1499 simulations. However, a residual risk remained
at any S unless all points were simulated.
In the third, our approach, a calibrated AdaBoost classifier
was used to estimate the risk of relying on these predictions
and simulations were performed accordingly. The result of
inaccurate predictions is shown in Fig. 6c. Initially (S = 0),
20 predictions out of |ΩP | = 1500 were inaccurate. Then,
our approach identified these 20 inaccurate predictions after
only 59 simulations. Any further of the 1441 simulations
were not needed as not reducing inaccuracies or risks. Our
approach reduced the number of simulations in comparison to
the first approach by 96 %. In terms of risks, our approach
reduced risks with a steep slope and approached zero after
these 59 simulations as per Fig. 6d. This was a key finding as a
traditional operator using the N-1 criterion could significantly
reduce the computational effort to analyse each fault while
ensuring the same risk tolerance level.
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Fig. 7: Probabilistic perspective across contingencies and operating points.
Inaccurate predictions are in (a) and residual risk is in (b).
F. Considering several contingencies
First, the IEEE 6-bus system was used for two contingencies
to illustrate before the French Transmission grid was used
to showcase the benefits for multiple contingencies. The two
contingencies ΩC = {3, 5} were used; parameters from c = 3
as before and parameters for c = 5 were pC5 = 0.0003
and C5 = 500501 . One AdaBoost classifier was trained for each
contingency and tested with |ΩP | = 1500 operating points
that resulted in |ΩS | = 3000 testing scenarios. After only
104 simulations out of these 3000, all inaccurate predictions
were found and the risk drops to zero as presented in Fig.
7. In the conventional approach, where machine-learning is
not involved, all of these 3000 scenarios needs simulating;
hence the reduction in computations is 95 % that illustrated
the significance of this approach.
On the French system, 11 contingencies were considered
resulting in 16500 testing scenarios (|ΩS | = 1500 × 11 =
16500). 11 AdaBoost classifiers were trained and used as
described in the second and our third approach in Sec. III-A.
In Fig. 8a we show the reductions of missed alarms of our
approach. When relying only on machine learning 1093 of
the 16500 scenarios were inaccurately predicted; hence the
test error was 7 %. Our approach reduced these inaccurate
predictions by 50 % (547) within the first 2215 simulations. In
terms of risks and in comparison with the standard classifier
approach, our approach reduced risks much faster (Fig. 8b). In
the standard classifier, the risk decreased slowly and dropped
sharply around 15000 simulations. This result implied that the
risk of false alarms was higher than of missing alarms. In our
approach the risk reduced quickly within the first simulations:
e.g., the risk reduced by 50 % after 1167 simulations (7 % of
the 16500). This monotonic decrease in the overall residual
risk
∑
Zc showed our approach identified high-risk points in
a real dataset and for a large grid.
G. Sensitivity of parameter estimations
The sensitivity to inaccurate estimations of costs CF1c and
probabilities pc was investigated in two studies on the French
system. The first study focused on inaccurate estimations in a
single contingency and the second on a systematic inaccuracy
in all contingencies.
In the first study, the estimated cost or probability of a
single, randomly selected contingency was α = 100 times
higher/lower than the actuals Cc = 10001001 and pc = 0.0005.
The estimates were used to guide simulations and the actual
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Fig. 8: The probabilistic perspective on multiple contingencies in the French
Transmission grid. Inaccurate predictions are in (a) and residual risk in (b).
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Fig. 9: The risk-sensitivity on inaccurately estimating parameters at (a) a single
contingency and at (b) all contingencies. The inaccuracies α and 1
α
are either
in costs ( , ) or in probabilities ( , ), or superposed ( ). Accurate
estimation in the probabilistic perspective ( ) and standard classifier ( ).
parameters to compute the residual risk
∑
Zc. Then, the
analysis of Zc allowed to judge the impact of inaccurate
estimations. As it was expected, slightly slower reductions in
risks were observed in the results in Fig. 9a. However, our
probabilistic perspective that used these (inaccurate) parame-
ters still significantly outperformed a standard classifier.
In the second study, the inaccuracy was systematic at
α = 10 in all 11 contingencies either in costs CF1c or
probabilities pc or superposed. The results in Fig. 9b showed
risks increased significantly at α = 10 and reduced slightly at
the inverse 1α = 0.1. When superposed where the inaccuracy
of all probabilities and costs were at α = 10 the risks
increased drastically. Although our proposed approach was
strongly affected it still outperformed a standard classifier.
H. Computations
The generation of the training database required time for
simulations of faults that were on the French system 57 s
per simulation on a computer cluster (actual DSA) [16]. The
training and calibration of classifiers took on average 445 s
on a standard notebook. However, this training only required
being done once. A significant advantage of the proposed
approach was that re-training was not required when the input
parameters change as they were accounted instantaneously in
the decision threshold applied to the classifier’ output.
The prediction of an operating point in the short-term
operation took  0.1 s. In comparison, the simulation of a
single operating point required 57 s. This difference illustrated
the main benefit of using machine-learning based DSA in the
short-term operation. Our approach used this benefit and that
actual DSA being always accurate.
8I. Discussion
The probabilistic perspective showed promising results on
addressing cost skewness and class imbalances of the asym-
metric learning problem. Furthermore, inaccurate predictions
are effectively reduced by identifying points entailing high
risks. We have shown that in the French study, 25 % of simu-
lations identify inaccurate predictions. The risk of relying on
machine-learning based DSA reduces, even when parameters
estimations were inaccurate to the extent of two orders of
magnitudes. A key finding is that computations reduced by
around 90 % in the online workflow. This finding enables
also the possibility to account for many more contingency
scenarios, which may become the key bottleneck of DSA
approaches in the future, when many more flexible devices
will be deployed in the system. An additional key benefit is
that frequent changes in the estimations of input parameters
can immediately taken into account.
In terms of limitations, these estimations of costs and prob-
abilities may not be straightforward. More general limitations
exist for machine-learning based DSA: e.g., the number of
offline computations may be large as well, as the training
database and classifiers need to be updated as the underlying
probability distributions of the data changes over time.
V. CONCLUSION
The challenges of machine-learning based DSA have been
presented, showing that DSA can suffer from high operational
risks when relying solely on machine-learning. In contrast,
relying solely on traditional operating practices showed infea-
sible computational requirements. In response, we proposed a
probabilistic perspective to address these disadvantages by us-
ing their advantages of machine-learning (fast) and traditional
operating practices (accurate). A probabilistic output of ma-
chine learning was used to focus detailed assessments on high-
risk contingencies while dealing with class imbalances and
skewed costs of the training data. This probabilistic perspective
on DSA can reduce the number of simulations in the short-
term operation by 95 %, gives insights into the operational
risks involved and ensures a quantifiable risk tolerance level.
Through a case study on a dataset of the French Transmission
Grid, the proposed approach demonstrates to find the most
critical contingencies and operating conditions. The proposed
approach requires no parameter-tuning and can immediately
consider changes in costs or probabilities of contingencies.
This work enables, for the first time, to move from determin-
istic operating schemes to a probabilistic operating paradigm.
We proposed a way to use traditional security schemes more
effectively and allowing scaling to multiple contingencies and
considering dynamics. In the future, the proposed approach
will be tested considering multiple asset failures. And, as this
work enables to operate assets closer to their limits, the cost
benefits when moving to this probabilistic operating scheme
should be quantified.
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